User Controlled Authorization Network (UCAN) Specification

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ucan-wg / spec Public Notifications You must be signed in to change notification settings Fork 21 Star 285 main Branches Tags Go to file Code Open more actions menu Folders and files Name Name Last commit message Last commit date Latest commit History 92 Commits 92 Commits .github .github design design fixtures fixtures .clabot .clabot .custom-words.txt .custom-words.txt .spellcheck.yml .spellcheck.yml CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md CONTRIBUTING.md CONTRIBUTING.md Community_Specification_License-v1.md Community_Specification_License-v1.md Governance.md Governance.md LICENSE LICENSE Notices.md Notices.md README.md README.md Scope.md Scope.md View all files Repository files navigation User Controlled Authorization Network (UCAN) Specification Version 1.0.0 Editors Brooklyn Zelenka , Witchcraft Software Authors Irakli Gozalishvili , Protocol Labs Daniel Holmgren , Bluesky Philipp Krüger , number zero Brooklyn Zelenka , Witchcraft Software Sub-Specifications UCAN Delegation UCAN Invocation UCAN Promise UCAN Revocation Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

User-Controlled Authorization Network (UCAN) is a trustless , secure, local-first , user-originated, distributed authorization scheme. This document provides a high level overview of the components of the system, concepts, and motivation. Exact formats are given in sub-specifications .

User-Controlled Authorization Network (UCAN) is a trustless , secure, local-first , user-originated, distributed authorization scheme. It provides public-key verifiable, delegable, expressive, openly extensible capabilities . UCANs achieve public verifiability with late-bound certificate chains and principals represented by decentralized identifiers (DIDs) .

UCAN improves the familiarity and adoptability of schemes like SPKI/SDSI for web and native application contexts. UCAN allows for the creation, delegation, and invocation of authority by any agent with a DID, including traditional systems and peer-to-peer architectures beyond traditional cloud computing.

If we practice our principles, we could have both security and functionality. Treating security as a separate concern has not succeeded in bridging the gap between principle and practice, because it operates without knowledge of what constitutes least authority.

Since at least Multics , access control lists ( ACL s) have been the most popular form of digital authorization, where a list of what each user is allowed to do is maintained on the resource. ACLs (and later RBAC ) have been a successful model suited to architectures where persistent access to a single list is viable. ACLs require that rules are sufficiently well specified, such as in a centralized database with rules covering all possible permutations of scenario. This both imposes a very high maintenance burden on programmers as a systems grows in complexity, and is a key vector for confused deputies .

With increasing interconnectivity between machines becoming commonplace, authorization needs to scale to meet the load demands of distributed systems while providing partition tolerance. However, it is not always practical to maintain a single central authorization source. Even when copies of the authorization list are distributed to the relevant servers, latency and partitions introduce troublesome challenges with conflicting updates, to say nothing of storage requirements.

A large portion of personal information now also moves through connected systems. As a result, data privacy is a prominent theme when considering the design of modern applications, to the point of being legislated in parts of the world.

Ahead-of-time coordination is often a barrier to development in many projects. Flexibility to define specialized authorization semantics for resources and the ability to integrate with external systems trustlessly are essential as the number of autonomous, specialized, and coordinated applications increases.

Many high-value applications run in hostile environments. In recognition of this, many vendors now include public key functionality, such as non-extractable keys in browsers , certificate systems for external keys , platform keys , and [secure hardware enclaves] in widespread consumer devices.

Two related models that work exceptionally well in the above context are Simple Public Key Infrastructure ( SPKI ) and object capabilities ( OCAP ). Since offline operation and self-verifiability are two requirements, UCAN adopts a certificate capability model related to SPKI .

The following analogies illustrate several significant trade-offs between these systems but are only accurate enough to build intuition. A good resource for a more thorough presentation of these trade-offs is Capability Myths Demolished . In this framework, UCAN approximates SPKI with some dynamic features.

By analogy, ACLs are like a bouncer at an exclusive event. This bouncer has a list attendees allowed in and which of those are VIPs that get extra access. People trying to get in show their government-issued ID and are accepted or rejected. In addition, they may get a lanyard to identify that they have previously been allowed in. If someone is disruptive, they can simply be crossed off the list and denied further entry.

If there are many such events at many venues, the organizers need to coordinate ahead of time, denials need to be synchronized, and attendees need to show their ID cards to many bouncers. The likelihood of the bouncer letting in the wrong person due to synchronization lag or confusion by someone sharing a name is nonzero.

UCANs work more like movie tickets or a festival pass. No one needs to check your ID; who you are is irrelevant. For example, if you have a ticket issued by the theater to see Citizen Kane, you are admitted to Theater 3. If you cannot attend an event, you can hand this ticket to a friend who wants to see the film instead, and there is no coordination required with the theater ahead of time. However, if the theater needs to cancel tickets for some reason, they need a way of uniquely identifying them and sharing this information between them.

Object capability ("ocap") systems use a combination of references, encapsulated state, and proxy forwarding. As the name implies, this is fairly close to object-oriented or actor-based systems. Object capabilities are robust , flexible, and expressive.

To achieve these properties, object capabilities have two requirements: fail-safe , and locality preservation. The emphasis on consistency rules out partition tolerance 1 .

Each UCAN includes an assertions of what it is allowed to do. "Proofs" are positive evidence (elsewhere called "witnesses") of the possession of rights. They are cryptographically verifiable chains showing that the UCAN issuer either claims to directly own a resource, or that it was delegated to them by some claimed owner. In the most common case, the root owner's ID is the only globally unique identity for the resource.

Root capability issuers function as verifiable, distributed roots of trust. The delegation chain is by definition a provenance log. Private keys themselves SHOULD NOT move from one context to another. Keeping keys unique to each physical device and unique per use case is RECOMMENDED to reduce opportunity for keys to leak, and limit blast radius in the case of compromises. "Sharing authority without sharing keys" is provided by capabilities, so there is no reason to share keys directly.

Note that a structurally and cryptographically valid UCAN chain can be semantically invalid. The executor MUST verify the ownership of any external resources at execution time. While not possible for all use cases (e.g. replicated state machines and eventually consistent data), having the Executor be the resource itself is RECOMMENDED.

While certificate chains go a long way toward improving security, they do not provide confinement on their own. The principle of least authority SHOULD be used when delegating a UCAN: minimizing the amount of time that a UCAN is valid for and reducing authority to the bare minimum required for the delegate to complete their task. This delegate should be trusted as little as is practical since they can further sub-delegate their authority to others without alerting their delegator. UCANs do not offer confinement (as that would require all processes to be online), so it is impossible to guarantee knowledge of all of the sub-delegations that exist. The ability to revoke some or all downstream UCANs exists as a last resort.

Inversion of control is achieved due to two properties: self-certifying delegation and reference passing. There is no Authorization Server (AS) that sits between requestors and resources. In traditional terms, the owner of a UCAN resource is the resource server (RS) directly.

This inverts the usual relationship between resources and users: the resource grants some (or all) authority over itself to agents, as opposed to an Authorization Server managing the relationship between them. This has several major advantages:

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There are several roles that an agent MAY assume:

flowchart TD subgraph Agent subgraph Principal direction TB subgraph Issuer direction TB subgraph Subject direction TB Executor Owner end Revoker end subgraph Audience Invoker end end Validator end Loading Subject At the very least every object should have a URL

Every Erlang process in the universe should be addressable and introspective

A [Subject] represents the Agent that a capability is for. A Subject MUST be referenced by DID . This behaves much like a GUID , with the addition of public key verifiability. This unforgeability prevents malicious namespace collisions which can lead to confused deputies .

A resource is some data or process that can be uniquely identified by a URI . It can be anything from a row in a database, a user account, storage quota, email address, etc. Resource MAY be as coarse or fine grained as desired. Finer-grained is RECOMMENDED where possible, as it is easier to model the principle of least authority ( PoLA ).

A resource describes the noun of a capability. The resource pointer MUST be provided in URI format. Arbitrary and custom URIs MAY be used, provided that the intended recipient can decode the URI. The URI is merely a unique identifier to describe the pointer to — and within — a resource.

Having a unique agent represent a resource (and act as its manager) is RECOMMENDED. However, to help traditional ACL-based systems transition to certificate capabilities, an agent MAY manage multiple resources, and act as the registrant in the ACL system .

Unless explicitly stated, the Resource of a UCAN MUST be the Subject.

The Issuer ( iss ) and Audience (